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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [] WSC BRIEFING CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S

4 March 1959

25X1

- In Iraq, Prime Minister Qasim has for the first time publicly I. replied to Masir's propaganda attacks on him.
 - A. Without mentioning Nasir or the UAR by name, Qasim accused Nasir of withholding full support for the Algerian rebels, or failing to cooperate generally to establish Arab foreign, military, and economic policies, and of subsidizing "mercenary newspapers" to attack Iraq.
 - Qasim echoed recent Communist propaganda in contrasting the B. "dictatorship" of Nasir with the rule of "the people" which he claimed exists in Iraq.
 - C. Attack on Nasir over Algerian issue hits Masir in currently vulnerable spot, since relations between Nasir and Algerian leaders have recently deteriorated while Masir entering deals to sell Egyptian cotton to France.
 - Qasim may have chance to replace Masir as Arab champion of Algerian rebel cause; if closer relations develop between Baghdad and Algerian rebels, this could also be channel for increased Communist contacts with rebels.

25X1

No sign of relaxation or repression of Communist drive in Iraq.

II.

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25X6

- III. In Iran Soviet propaganda against the Shah and his regime continues steadily. Moscow has reportedly warned Tehran that the signing of the bilateral agreement with the US will be regarded as a "hostile act."
 - A. Step up of Soviet propaganda is thus indicated, possibly supported with new economic and political pressures. (AS WAS MENTIONNES)
 - B. Iran has already approached UN Secretary General Hammarskjold on plans to raise the issue of Soviet pressures and propaganda in the United Nations. Hammarskjold has indicated he would raise the question when he visits Moscow in tate March.
 - C. Despite the regime's bold front, it is clear Iran is seriously disturbed.

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